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Abstract

Many studies have been conducted to examine how false confessions occur, and what their
impacts are. Throughout its history, America has instituted standards for interrogation
procedures that are aligned with research findings and that build off constitutional principles.
These are designed to protect individual rights while still accomplishing the goals of the judicial
system. This paper discusses false confessions, interrogation laws, and how these impact a
suspect, as well as the other influences acting upon suspects including plea bargaining and
psychological processes. A compilation of research findings and case law culminates in the
conclusion that changes must be made to the American criminal justice system in order to
minimize the risk of false confessions and ensure that individual rights are protected.
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Evolution of Confession Law

“There is no piece of erroneous evidence that if put before a jury is more likely to lead to
a wrongful conviction than a false confession” (Leo & Davis, 2010, p. 50). In the small
percentage of cases that travel all the way from initial arrest to trial, an even smaller percentage
reach a conviction because of a confession. While in some cases, confessional evidence
corroborates the defendant’s testimony of events, in others, a suspect’s confession does not
match up with what truly happened. A variety of factors can cause this, such as suspect
vulnerability and police pressure.
The difficult task of law enforcement requires a multifaceted candidate who demonstrates
aptitude in many areas and passes a strict vetting process. However, even with extensive training
and the best intentions, in rare instances officers can interrogate in such a way that induces a
suspect’s false admission of guilt (DeClue, 2005). Only a small percentage of cases travel from a
crime’s commission to a conviction; a mere 2.1% of cases ever make it to court, and in only
0.4% of cases will an offender receive a custodial sentence (Ratcliffe, 2012). False confessions
do not always come as a result of officer actions; they can also be due to factors inherent in or
imposed upon the suspect (Morehouse, 2019). Even when an officer has the intention of seeking
the truth, there are inevitable psychological processes that occur in a suspect’s mind that can
overpower an interrogator’s efforts to elicit a true, accurate account of events. These practical
and psychological factors may induce an innocent individual to confess, and they have been
studied to determine how risk factors can be minimized.
From its founding, America has sought to protect individual rights and liberties. This is
especially true for criminal rights; the Constitution has provided a foundation for legal
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precedents that continue to be shaped today (Grunewald, 2014). Its amendments continue to
clarify the rights of the accused as interrogation law is changed to meet the legal requirements
that the Constitution is interpreted to have. The current standards for a confession’s admissibility
are not unfounded, but have been built upon preceding case law and legal doctrines. These
standards exist to protect the rights of both the innocent and the accused, as well as prevent
wrongful convictions, particularly for those who are most vulnerable. This includes the
conviction of an individual via plea bargaining, which is a popular method of justice used to
reduce the overcrowded court system; in urban areas, plea bargaining accounts for 65% of case
outcomes (Redlich et al., 2017).
As times and laws change, so do the standards for interrogation procedures and
confession admissibility. In light of current research and case law developments, these changes
must continue. All criminal justice actors can take part in the continued editing and transforming
of confession law, as it adapts to continue to meet the justice system’s goals of maintaining
individual rights and liberties while enacting justice to protect the nation. Current research and
existing case law must be utilized to make changes to interrogative procedure and the handling
of confessions (DeClue, 2005; French, 2019; Griffin, 2016; Janzen, 2019; Kassin, 2015;
Kukucka & Evelo, 2019; MacLean et al., 2015; Primus, 2015; Scherr et al., 2020). This will
protect individual rights, elicit the most accurate confession possible, and reduce the instances of
false confessions and wrongful convictions.
Literature Review
In order to accomplish the goal of justice in the criminal justice system, the correct
perpetrator of a crime must be the one who is convicted (Grunewald, 2014). However, this does
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not always occur due to various errors. As of 2019, of the 362 wrongful convictions uncovered
by the Innocence Project, 100 were found to be a result of a false confession (French, 2019).
Nearly 30% of DNA exonerations in the United States have occurred because the conviction was
a result of a false confession (Scherr et al., 2020). Even factually innocent people can get caught
up in a wrongful conviction; oftentimes, they are at risk as soon as they waive their rights
because doing so accelerates the process towards a conviction (Scherr et al., 2020). Because
approximately 95% of cases in the United States are resolved by plea bargaining, people are
often in and out of the justice system quickly, and thus wrongfully convicted without going to
trial (Scherr et al., 2020). While plea bargaining is a means of reducing the caseloads weighing
down America’s court system, it has become much more common and routine (Grunewald,
2014).
False confessions’ links to psychology have been seen throughout history, such as in the
widely publicized case of Kitty Genovese, which not only showed the powerful impact of the
bystander effect, but also of false confessions and wrongful convictions (Kassin, 2017). Age and
suggestibility are highly correlated with one’s likelihood of giving a false confession (Gee,
2009), and coercive techniques are the most likely to elicit a false confession (Morehouse, 2019).
The tests that evaluate the voluntariness and reliability of confessions are not adequate after a
suspect has been threatened with the death penalty (Morehouse, 2019). Popular techniques in an
interrogation include the interrogator making a determination of guilt or innocence before the
main portion of the interrogation takes place; this stems from the widely used Reid technique
(Inbau et al., 2013). This technique can be problematic because the average person is truly no
better than chance at determining another’s guilt or innocence, and the average interviewer is
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only slightly better than the average person at determining these from the initial interview (Leo
et al., 2013).
A confession tends to be the centerpiece of a prosecutor’s case, so once it is elicited, it is
hard to overcome; it is “uniquely prejudicial” (Leo et al., 2013, p. 774), unlike any other form of
evidence (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019; Morehouse, 2019). Today, a wrongfully admitted false
confession can remain part of a trial as long as the prosecution can prove that it was harmless to
the outcome of the trial (Strang, 2020). While safeguards are in place to help prevent false
confessions, more can be done (Leo et al., 2013), and this is important because those who falsely
confess are more susceptible to being stigmatized because they are seen as more responsible for
their own wrongful conviction (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019). Ultimately, more can and should be
done by all criminal justice actors to minimize false confession risk and protect individual
liberties.
False Confessions
When innocent people admit to a crime that they did not commit, or to a crime that is of a
greater degree than the one that they committed, they are giving a false confession. In other
words, a false confession is “an admission of guilt followed by a factual description of a crime
that the individual confessing did not actually commit” (Janzen, 2019, p. 87). Typically, a false
confession is expected to contain details that only the true perpetrator of a crime would know
(Gould & Leo, 2010). Contrary to what is seen on television and in movies, an interrogator’s
intimidation tactics are typically not why a suspect ultimately confesses. In reality, false
confessions tend to occur unintentionally on behalf of all involved parties. The occurrences of
false confessions are fairly low; police-induced confessions were found to constitute 15 to 20%
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of wrongful convictions that were uncovered using DNA evidence (Leo, 2009): “Among the first
1200 cases collected by the National Registry of Exonerations, approximately 13% involved a
false confession” (Norris & Redlich, 2014, p. 1016). However, there remains more that can be
done to ensure they are prevented.
Defining the Term “False Confession”
When a suspect chooses to give a factual description of an offense, it usually includes
specific details about the crime that would only be known to its offender, as well as why the
offender chose to commit it. Certain telltale signs can cause a court to determine that a
confession is false. For example, when there is evidence that the crime did not actually occur, or
the existing evidence shows that it would be impossible for the person who confessed to have
committed the crime (Janzen, 2019). A confession can also be deemed false when the person
who actually committed the crime comes forward, or evidence shows that the person who
confessed is actually innocent (Janzen, 2019). There are reasons why someone would confess to
a crime they did not commit, which will be further discussed later.
Confessions are inextricably linked with voluntariness. If a confession is found to have
been given involuntarily, it will be deemed false. So, what exactly makes a confession
voluntary? Appelbaum (2009) states that, “A defendant’s behavior will be presumed to be
voluntary in the absence of some external, intentional, and illegitimate action on the part of the
official” (p. 423). Key factors to consider are where an official’s actions can be proven to be
coercive or unethical in some way. For example, an official cannot issue a threat while the
suspect is undergoing “substantial” mental or physical duress (Appelbaum, 2009, p. 424). This,
of course, raises the question of what constitutes substantial duress, a definition that has been
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shaped over time by case law. Even deception by an interrogator does not invalidate a confession
unless it interferes with the suspect’s exercise of his or her rights (Appelbaum, 2009). In fact,
interrogators are taught to engage in lengthy interrogations that can: infer promises or threats,
occur in an uncomfortable environment, use deceptive techniques such as lying, and lie about
eyewitnesses or codefendants implicating the suspect (Gee, 2009). Standards for voluntariness
vary and ultimately depend on the circumstances of each case, the characteristics of the
defendant, and the jurisdiction (Lloyd, 2018).
The tenacity displayed by police in doing their duty of apprehending criminals is seldom
overridden by their desire to convict someone; they do not set out to obtain a false confession or
wrongful conviction, as this would be a great injustice to those they have sworn to serve. Rather,
police seek to elicit truthful, accurate confessions in order “to reduce their caseload and to
increase their statistics of closed cases” (Gee, 2009, p. 52), as well as to uphold their duty as law
enforcement. The instances of false confessions are relatively low, but must be addressed
nonetheless in order to protect innocent citizens from being wrongfully convicted. Throughout
America’s history, rights that were set in stone by the Constitution have been adapted to meet the
needs of an evolving and growing country.
Constitutional Rights
In a discussion of the history of interrogation law, the three main rights that have
prevailed since the signing of the Constitution cannot be ignored. The 5th Amendment right to
remain silent, the 6th Amendment right to counsel, and the 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due
process and voluntariness have been engrained in the justice system and affected by new case
law to reflect the changing attitude of the justice system over time. Thus, they have had an
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integral role since the founding of the United States, as they compose the foundation that the rest
of confession laws build upon.
5th Amendment
The 5th Amendment right to remain silent has a huge influence over the verdict of case
whether or not a suspect asserts it. Salinas v. Texas (2013) determined that silence constitutes an
admission of guilt if maintained in a noncustodial setting because explicit verbal invocation of
one’s 5th Amendment rights is required. Thus, this decision supports the use of silence as a
confession, which can be used by the prosecution to strengthen their case. When a suspect asserts
their right to silence, this can be helpful in allowing them to build their strategy with their legal
counsel and avoid incriminating themselves. If they fail to verbally assert their right to silence, a
suspect risks allowing law enforcement to insert material into their confession, which also
introduces errors into the process (Griffin, 2016). In court, the prosecution can use silence as
evidence of guilt when it is not specifically asserted as a right by a suspect. Then, it can be used
against a suspect at trial to “impeach [their] excuse, explanation, or alibi” (Griffin, 2016, p. 708).
Further, silence in response to a statement can “qualify as a defendant’s adoption of that
statement for purposes of the exemption of a party’s own admissions from the hearsay
prohibition” (Griffin, 2016, p. 708). So, while suspects do in fact have a right to remain silent,
they must assert this right, and then follow up by remaining fully silent until they can consult
with legal counsel. This will minimize false confession risk.
6th Amendment
A suspect’s right to counsel is outlined in the 6th Amendment, which grants this right to
all suspects before they are interrogated. The opportunity to discuss with counsel not only helps

CONFESSION LAW

11

to preserve a suspect’s rights, but also allows the team to discuss potential strategies that they
can implement beginning in the interrogation and throughout the following judicial processes, if
needed. Strategizing early on can help defendants maintain a consistent strategy throughout their
time in the judicial system, including maintaining their innocence or otherwise adopting the best
method of defense. It can also prevent false confessions because the attorney can help the
defendant prepare and know what to expect in questioning.
5th and 14th Amendment: Due Process and Voluntariness
The 5th Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination also entails the protection of
maintaining voluntariness, which was determined in Bram v. U.S. (1897; Morehouse, 2019).
However, voluntariness is a tricky, multifaceted subject. Even the presence of counsel does not
ensure a defendant’s voluntariness, especially if the two have not had time to fully discuss the
case yet (Inbau et al., 2013).
The right to voluntariness was called into question in People v. Guilford (1984), which
determined that even though the defendant received an eight-hour break in the interrogation
process, this break “was insufficient to remove the influence of his wrongful interrogation from
his mind” (Iemma, 2014, p. 17). In other words, Guilford’s confession was deemed involuntary
because of the length of the preceding interrogation. Thus, regardless of Guilford and his
interrogator’s intentions, the legality of his circumstances was determined by an objective
measure: time. Objective standards such as this have been further modified in court decisions
ruling on the 5th and 14th Amendments’ right to voluntariness.
Today, police can lie about anything in an interrogation as long as it does not violate the
14th Amendment (Janzen, 2019), which guarantees the right, to life, liberty, and property with
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due process of law (Lloyd, 2018). In Brown v. Mississippi (1936), the Supreme Court first ruled
that “statements coerced by law officers were inadmissible in state courts under the 14th
Amendment’s due process clause” (Strang, 2020, p. 77). The Supreme Court has interpreted this
to mean that although an involuntary confession cannot be admitted as evidence (Kassin, 2015),
coercive conduct can still occur to some degree in order to elicit a confession. However,
opportunities for coercion are limited because the interrogation tactics that are coercive in nature
cannot be considered to elicit a voluntary confession in any circumstance (Kassin, 2015). The
14th Amendment essentially requires that as long as a judge does not determine that police
pressure overrode a defendant’s voluntary action, a confession is voluntary; judges do so using a
totality of circumstances test (Leo et al., 2013). This necessitates that they evaluate the
interrogation methods, police conduct, resulting statement, and whether there was a causal
relationship between police conduct and the statement (Leo et al., 2013).
The typical test for due process and voluntariness, the totality of the circumstances test, is
frequently cited as being too vague and indeterminate, too subject to opinion (Leo et al., 2013).
This test calls for judges to assess the totality of the circumstances of a case to decide whether
police conduct overrode a suspect’s free will, and if this action led to the issuance of a false
confession. Again, there must have been a causal element between the police’s conduct and the
resulting statement (Leo et al., 2013). The 5th and 14th Amendment rights to due process and
voluntariness are perhaps the most difficult constitutional rights to apply to interrogations and
confessions because of the inconsistency and subjectivity in their application.
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History
The legal determination of what makes a confession voluntary has evolved over time.
Since the writing of the Constitution, case law has adapted along with the justice system to
address changing perspectives regarding what constitutes voluntariness. Traditionally, the courts
have “granted considerable scope to deceive suspects, such as the time-honored approach of
telling a suspect that a confederate had already confessed to a crime” (Appelbaum, 2009, p. 423).
The American judicial system must continue to the process of editing and reforming standards
for confessions and interrogations in order to pursue an accurate confession.
Perhaps the earliest case which addressed confessions was Rex v. Warickshall (1783),
which determined that no confession should come from hope or fear; a confession that comes as
a result of these emotions should not be credible. While this is a great ideal, this was impractical
for everyday life because many suspects desired to rid themselves of the risks and costs
associated with going to trial. This issue was highlighted when the Civil War ended. It became
popular for attorneys to stand out in the street in front of a courthouse, offering defendants a flat
rate for a predetermined sentence length. This was a quick fix solution that did not take into
account a defendant’s actual guilt or innocence; defendants were willing to accept a definitive
punishment for a small fee, rather than an uncertain punishment in a trial and high court costs
pay (Dervan & Edkins, 2013).
The history of false confessions in America begins in 1819, which marked the first
known case in which a false confession let to a wrongful confession; in Vermont, Stephen and
Jesse Boorn were wrongfully convicted of murder based on their confessions (Janzen, 2019;
Norris & Redlich, 2014). It was not until 1897 that Bram v. United States determined that under
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the 5th Amendment, in federal cases only, a confession is invalid if it is extracted by violence or a
threat of violence, false promises, or exertion of improper influence.
In 1931, the Wickersham Commission Report was issued to address public concern over
increases in crime (Theoharis, 2013). It attempted to change administrative procedures and
address areas where law enforcement was ineffective, including abuses of power (Theoharis,
2013). The report showed an early concern for policing tactics, and how this concern was
addressed legally. Soon after, Brown v. Mississippi (1936) further restricted police tactics by
determining that there can be no physical abuse in the interrogation process. In 1954, Leyra v.
Denno established more restrictions on what constituted due process. In this notable case, a
psychiatrist impersonated a doctor in order to get a suspect to admit guilt. The psychiatrist was
able to use skillful questioning to obtain a confession under his premise as a medical
professional. Although this initially did not matter to the court, the impersonation was eventually
determined to not be an upholding of due process, especially because the defendant did not have
counsel present with him at the time of his confession.
The 1900s were a period of greater clarification as to the elements of a voluntary
confession. In 1960, Blackburn v. Alabama built upon earlier cases which had found that
confessions should not be extracted under harsh circumstances. This case determined that not
only must a confession not result from violence or threats, but it must also be “the product of a
rational intellect and a free will” (Appelbaum, 2009, p. 423). This was an important clarification,
as it further defined the requirements for voluntariness under the 5th and 14th Amendments. In
1964, two major cases impacted voluntariness. The voluntariness clause of the 14th Amendment
was extended to cover not only federal cases, but also state cases in Malloy v. Hogan (1964).
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This means that from Bram v. US (1897) through 1964, defendants in state trials could not
invoke their 5th Amendment right to exclude a coerced confession from being admitted to trial
(Janzen, 2019). The second major constitutional right, the 6th Amendment right to counsel, was
applied to police interrogations in Escobedo v. Illinois (1964). In Moran v. Burbine (1986), the
Supreme Court further clarified that a voluntary confession is also one that is “the product of a
free and deliberate choice, rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception” (Rogers et al., 2010,
p. 67). One element necessary in any interrogation is the Miranda warning, established by
Miranda v. Arizona (1966), which built upon the third constitutional right, the 5th Amendment
right to remain silent. This necessitates that at the time of arrests, a suspect is advised of their
rights and law enforcement must also obtain a waiver from them for these rights. The Miranda
rights are: the right to remain silent; if the suspect chooses to speak, what they say can be used
against them in court; the suspect has the right to consult with a lawyer and have them present
during questioning; if the suspect cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed if requested by
the suspect (Miranda v. Arizona, 1966). In Florida v. Powell (2010), the Supreme Court
determined that these rights must not be stated word-for-word; only the fully effective equivalent
of the Miranda warning is necessary as a prerequisite to a statement’s admissibility. In other
words, this case further defined Miranda by requiring that an individual be clearly informed of
his constitutional rights prior to questioning, particularly the right to counsel.
Colorado v. Connelly (1986) clarified what behavior was considered coercive on the part
of interrogators, by stating that a confession is presumed to be voluntary in the absence of
coercive behaviors by interrogators. In other words, “some level of external coercion would be
required before the effects of the suspect’s mental condition could be considered” (Rogers et al.,
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2010, p. 67). Thus, in a case where a defendant claims that his confession was false, he must
prove that there was coercion by law enforcement. Even after he is able to prove that coercion
occurred, the defendant’s mental state at the time of the confession must also be evaluated to
determine the extent that coercion occurred (Appelbaum, 2009). Mental health professionals
often become involved in determining a defendant’s mental state at the time of their confession.
Before Arizona v. Fulminante (1991), the finding that a confession was involuntary
automatically reversed the outcome of a case. However, Arizona v. Fulminate (1991) required
that an appellate court consider a confession’s admittance to see if it significantly impacted the
case. If the appellate court determined that the confession did not significantly affect the
outcome of a case, the court’s decision did not require a reversal. A false confession was no
longer enough to reverse a conviction, and this became dangerous for defendants who are more
vulnerable to issuing a false confession.
In 1992, the Innocence Project was founded, which marked the beginning of an era of
exoneration. This continues today as wrongfully convicted individuals continue to be exonerated
using DNA evidence. As of 2015, over 300 DNA exonerations had occurred, and this number
has since continued to rise (Mickes et al., 2015). Another more recent development that combats
wrongful conviction is The Citizens Protection Act of 1998, which was enacted in order to
protect against prosecutorial misconduct by requiring that federal prosecutors follow the same
laws and rules that apply to attorneys in their jurisdiction (MacLean et al., 2015). This ensures
that standards for state and federal prosecution were assimilated, similar to how Malloy v. Hogan
(1964) extended the 14th Amendment to cover both state and federal cases.
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Dickerson v. United States (2000) changed how a confession’s reliability is examined. It
instituted a deferential voluntariness test, which looks at the totality of the circumstances of a
confession, the characteristics of the accused, and the details of an interrogation. While this
seems like a useful method in determining voluntariness, it nearly always finds a confession to
be voluntary (Janzen, 2019). U.S. v. Boskic (2008) highlighted issues around voluntariness that
remain in question. In this case, Boskic met with government agents for an alleged discussion
that who deceived him regarding their meeting’s purpose, telling him it was about immigration
document. During the interview, after initial denials, Boskic eventually confessed to involvement
in the 1995 Srebrenica massacre, and provided verbal and written accounts of this (Appelbaum,
2009). At his resulting trial, Boskic claimed that his statements were a result of coercion because
the true purpose of the interview had not been disclosed to him. However, while the
government’s tactics were undoubtedly misleading, they did not meet the definition of coercion
at the time because Boskic had not been threatened; thus, his 5th Amendment right was not
violated (Appelbaum, 2009). In 2011, Bobby v. Dixon made it legal for police to misrepresent the
strength of their case against a suspect to the suspect. This gives the opportunity to extend what
happened in Boskic (2008) by not only making it legal to misrepresent the purpose of an
interrogation, but also the seriousness of it. This is why it is so important that a suspect be given
access to counsel, and that they use that right, before they are interrogated. Speaking with
counsel can change the outcome of a case and make suspects more aware of their rights.
From the early 2000s to the modern day, reform has been prevalent in the system in the
areas of confessions as evidence, expert testimonials, and confession reliability, in order to
prevent situations such as that of Boskic from happening. Recall People v. Guilford (1984), in
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which the standards for a confession’s voluntariness after a lengthy interrogation were
considered. In 2009, People v. Alexander stood in contrast to Guilford (1984) when “the court
found that eleven hours was a sufficient amount of time to purge the effects of the wrongful
interrogation from the mind of the defendant” (Iemma, 2014, p. 1172). This contradicted the
court’s earlier finding in Guilford that eight hours was not sufficient to render the suspect’s
subsequent confession voluntary. This shows how attitudes towards interrogation length have
changed and continue to do so.
In 2010, the Uniform Law Commission recommended that failure to record an
interrogation should be considered by judges when adjudicating a motion to suppress a
confession on other grounds (Leo et al., 2013). While this recognizes the unreliability of
confession evidence as a basis for suppression, it lacks a discussion of how such a practice could
be consistently and effectively implemented (Leo et al., 2013). In 2015, American Psychological
Association submitted three amicus briefs stating that reform is needed in confession evidence
because of its counter intuitiveness, difficulty of assessment, and that psychological experts are
needed at trial (Kassin, 2015; People v. Kowalski, 2012; Rivera v. Illinois, 2009).
All interrogation techniques can be traced back to the Reid Manual, which was a pioneer
model away from third degree, physically coercive interrogation models, which were originally
used, towards an accusatory model (French, 2019). This was instituted in 1974 and has been
widely implemented in both federal and state jurisdictions ever since (Inbau et al., 2013). This
has been a dominant model and has essentially set the standard for interrogation practices
(French, 2019). Reid was the first to move away from physically abusive methods of
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interrogation towards methods that used a knowledge of psychology to identify suspect guilt
followed by accusatory questioning to obtain a confession (French, 2019).
Current Admissibility Standards
These major cases and countless others have culminated in the current admissibility
standards for interrogations and confessions. These are: an act is considered voluntary unless
there is some external, intentional, illegitimate act by an official (Appelbaum, 2009); deception is
allowed as long as a person is not deceived of their rights (Appelbaum, 2009); a continued
presumption of the validity of confessions exists, absent of evidence otherwise (Leo & Davis,
2010); police cannot manufacture hard evidence in an attempt to cause a suspect to confess (Gee,
2009).
Despite these and other standards of admissibility and voluntariness, the full impact of
threats and promises in an interrogation are still not being taken into adequate account
(Morehouse, 2019). The current standards for voluntariness include that a confession is produced
freely and voluntarily (Morehouse, 2019), “in the absence of some external, intentional, and
illegitimate action on the part of the official” (Appelbaum, 2009, p. 423). However, Morehouse
claims that this requirement does not fully incorporate the standards of voluntariness outlined in
Bram (1897). Many factors are important and necessary to include in the determination of the
voluntariness of a confession. Deception can rarely be used as reasoning for a false confession,
because it has to involve information which is directly related to one’s exercise of rights; only
behavior such as threatening or creating substantial duress are sufficient to deem a confession
involuntary (Appelbaum, 2009). This means that in order to render a confession false, other
factors such as mental and physical duress and the presence of threats should be accounted for by
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the defense. These other factors do not include giving a defendant a false sense of security. When
evaluating voluntariness, a mental health professional may think that their subject has made a
decision under duress. However, their job is to determine that the confession was not coerced,
even if the suspect made a decision in less than ideal conditions (Appelbaum, 2009).
Prosecutors are tasked with showing that police complied with Miranda warning and
waiver requirements as well as elicited a voluntary confession under the 14th Amendment right to
due process (Leo et al., 2013). This requirement builds upon the long-held presumption of
innocence until proven guilty. Typically, a confession alone is not enough to render a suspect
guilty; there must be other evidence to suggest this as well (Leo et al., 2013), which is also up to
the prosecutors to find and present at trial.
Protecting Individual Rights
The techniques used in an interrogation room, while traditionally effective, affect the
innocent as well as the guilty. Therefore, harsh techniques may unintentionally implicate an
innocent person in a crime (Gee, 2009). Ensuring a voluntary confession is essential to preserve
integrity and dignity (Strang, 2020). While police are trained to avoid mistakes that heighten the
risk of eliciting a false confession such as contaminating an interrogation, they occur nonetheless
(Leo et al., 2013).
While some interrogation procedures are effective at eliciting a confession from a guilty
suspect, these same procedures can also contribute to false confessions (DeClue, 2005). Current
standards of what is considered admissible in an interrogative setting come as a result of trying to
prevent involuntary and forced confessions from occurring. While an involuntary confession
may be factual, it can nonetheless be inadmissible in court because of how it was extracted.
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While involuntary and forced confessions are not very common because police pursue justice
and remain within the boundaries of the law, they persist nonetheless.
People v. Guilford (2013) helped to delineate the boundaries between voluntary and
involuntary confessions and their admissibility. In this case, the defendant claimed that his
admission of guilt to murder was made 10 hours after the conclusion of a 42 ½
hour interrogation. During his interrogation, the defendant was placed in a windowless room
with nothing but a table and three chairs, was fed one sandwich, and was not allowed to sleep. In
this case, the efforts to break Guilford’s will in order to extract a confession were so
overwhelming that they deprived him of his basic human needs. As a result, the court could not
conclude that the defendant had recovered rapidly enough in the 10 hours after the interrogation
to restore “his basic capacity to exercise independent judgement” (People v. Guilford, 2013, p.
212). As a result, Guilford was granted a new trial. This case determined several tenants which
are necessary for a confession to be rendered voluntary: the basic human needs of food, water,
and sleep; no considerable physical and mental duress; and no threats. However, just because all
of these conditions are met, this does not guarantee that a confession will be admissible, because
of the possible presence of other extenuating circumstances.
Today’s laws require that in order for a confession to be rendered involuntary, some
official coercion or overreaching is necessary (Strang, 2020). Even mental illness or other affect
does not constitute reason to render a confession involuntary; rather, some state actor “must do
something affirmative to exploit the person’s vulnerability” (Strang, 2020, p. 82). This stems in
part from Rogers v. Richmond (1961), which affirms that the accuracy or probable accuracy of a
confession does not prove or disprove its voluntariness (Strang, 2020). This is an issue that
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cannot be ignored. More attention must be given to the circumstances under which a suspect
confessed, so that involuntary confessions can be brought to light.
Wrongful Convictions
Wrongfully convicted individuals spend an average of ten years in prison, and there were
1,702 exonerations of wrongfully convicted people between 1990 and 2015 (MacLean et al.,
2015). A wrongful conviction does not just include when someone is convicted of a crime they
are completely innocent of. It also includes those crimes in which the defendant’s sentence does
not accurately reflect his culpability in the crime (MacLean et al., 2015). As diligently as
criminal justice actors work to avoid accusing an innocent person, innocent or partially innocent
people can be convicted nonetheless. Several factors can increase the chance that an innocent
person is convicted because these factors make individuals more vulnerable and impressionable.
Because of the damning nature of a confession, the links between a confession and a conviction
are very strong. Overall, there exists a lack of understanding regarding the issues of false
confessions as they relate to wrongful convictions. While the risk of false confessions is known,
it is still wrongly believed that they are rare, and this combined with a lack of understanding of
the causes of false confessions present obstacles for exoneration and post-conviction relief (Leo
& Davis, 2010).
Consequences of Threats
Threatening to inflict harm, including the death penalty, upon a suspect or their family
heightens the risk of false confession; Grunewald asserts that “It is a fact that innocent suspects
confess and plead guilty to crimes they didn’t commit, especially when they face the death
penalty” (2014, p. 1162). One precursor to wrongful convictions is threats made by the
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interrogator. Morehouse offers an explanation as to why threatening a suspect with the death
penalty should render a confession involuntary. In the case of the “Norfolk Four,” a quad
of Navy sailors falsely confessed to the rape and murder of a navy sailor’s wife. Each of the men
tailored their confession to meet the standards that were given to them by police, despite their
innocence, and spent over 20 years imprisoned (Morehouse, 2019). Because rape and murder are
punishable by death under Virginia state law, the interrogator threatened the men with death, and
“police told them that the only way to escape the death penalty was to confess” (Morehouse,
2019, p. 532). However, in a turn of events, when the true killer was found more than one year
later, the police told the killer that the only way to avoid the death penalty was to implicate the
Norfolk Four in his confession. This is just one example of how people may confess to more
when they are faced with death than if they are threatened with a lesser penalty. By threatening a
suspect, an interrogator undermines the reliability as well as the voluntariness of a confession
(Morehouse, 2019).
Disadvantages Faced by the Wrongly Accused
Once someone is wrongly accused, he faces several disadvantages. These disadvantages
can accumulative and lead to a wrongful conviction (Scherr et al, 2020). As soon as a suspect
relents enough to provide a false confession, this can set in motion a presumption of guilt that is
extremely difficult to extract themselves from (Leo et al., 2013). A suspect’s vulnerability
coupled with an interrogator’s presumption of guilt can result in a false confession, and the
following disadvantages can persist into an individual’s efforts to reintegrate into society upon
their release (Scherr et al., 2020).
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Most American interrogations today utilize the Reid technique. The first step, the precustodial interview, occurs as interrogators try to get a read on their suspect and determine their
guilt or innocence (French, 2019). In this stage, an innocent suspect displays behavior associated
with innocence, such as having an overall naïve mindset (French, 2019). In many cases, an
innocent suspect will waive their Miranda rights to silence and an attorney, which sets them on a
course for failure in maintaining their innocence. If an interrogator determines that a suspect is
guilty based on his own personal evaluation of the suspect in the pre-custodial interview, he then
sets out to prove this guilt (French, 2019). During the custodial interrogation, the interrogator
often uses manipulative tactics on the presumed guilty suspect, such as presenting false evidence
and minimizing leniency that are known to increase risks of false confession (Scherr et al.,
2020). When an individual who is actually innocent confesses, his confession corrupts the
ensuing interrogation by impacting the testimony of witnesses and forensic examiners. These
testimonies are bent to fit into the suspect’s narrative, and the investigative results seem to
corroborate the false confession (French, 2019). This increases the chance that the suspect will
be found guilty. The accumulation of disadvantages faced by innocent people astronomically
increase the likelihood that they will plead guilty rather than face trial. Because a false
confession seems so counterintuitive, trials of innocent people who have falsely confessed are
often unsuccessful (Leo et al., 2013).
Contamination is another error that may cause an innocent suspect to plead guilty. This
occurs when an interviewer introduces information into an interrogation which would only be
known to the perpetrator of a crime or their accomplice (Alceste et al., 2020). Contamination
contributes to a suspect narrative that notes important details of the case accurately, despite the
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suspect’s actual innocence. Police can worsen occurrences of this by providing privileged
information that contaminates the narrative (Gould & Leo, 2010). Contamination is significantly
correlated with false confessions because it introduces facts only known to the perpetrator and
prolongs questioning (Primus, 2015). Without contamination, a false confession should be very
clear because the suspect’s narrative would be full of errors. However, contamination lives up to
its name in that it muddies a case, such as that of Godschalk (Commonwealth v. Godschalk,
1987), who got all the facts of the case right not because he was guilty, but because his
interrogation had been contaminated by those questioning him (Leo et al., 2013). An
interrogator’s unintentional contamination of a confession can come as a result of investigator
bias or tunnel vision (Leo et al., 2013). This can make it difficult to detect because the
investigator may not realize what they are doing, and if the process is not being recorded, there is
no objective evidence of the timeline of events that occurred.
Individuals who have higher levels of suggestibility are at even more of a disadvantage.
Research shows that high suggestibility is associated with diminished abilities to comprehend
Miranda rights (Rogers et al., 2010). Thus, those who are at risk of failing to comprehend their
rights also risk being more suggestible in an interrogative setting, which can be dangerous for
contamination (Rogers et al., 2010).
The Reid technique, while technically legal, can elicit a false confession depending on
how it is used. In the case of Nga Truong, a teen mom accused of killing her son, she confessed
after interrogators implemented the Reid technique (Commonwealth v. Truong, 2011). This case
involved no prior convictions, no material evidence, no DNA evidence, and no eyewitness
testimony to suggest that Truong was her son’s killer; the only evidence was her confession
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(Janzen, 2019). Ultimately, Truong’s statements were determined to be involuntary because of
deceit, false statements, false promises, and trickery on the part of the interrogators
(Commonwealth v. Truong, 2011; Janzen, 2019). Despite these findings, nearly each individual
technique used by interrogators was determined to be legal (Janzen, 2019). This demonstrates
some potentially problematic aspects of the Reid technique, namely that while each individual
technique may be allowed, when combined they create a model that significantly heightens a
suspect’s false confession risk.
The risk of eliciting a false confession that leads to a wrongful conviction is amplified
when police fail to record both the video and audio of an interrogation (Leo et al. 2014). Failure
to record all parts of an interrogation is a risky practice because incidences of contamination are
not put on record, and thus at trial is it an interviewer’s word against a suspect’s. This also makes
it harder for a jury to understand how and why someone would issue a false confession, because
they do not have primary evidence of it happening in the case they are judging. Contamination in
an interrogation “substantially increases the risk that a factually false confession will appear true
and persuasive, and that as a result it will lead to a wrongful conviction” (Leo et al., 2013, p.
766), and the court does the defendant a disservice by not providing the judge and jury with
evidence of potential contamination. Even when an individual confesses and later recants his
testimony, this is not always sufficient to reverse their previous statement; after all, those words
can never be erased from the records and the minds of those involved. Jurors commonly find it
hard to believe that someone who is innocent would confess, because they themselves feel they
would not do so (Leo et al., 2013). Jurors are particularly susceptible to accepting a confession as
truth, even if…they are told that the confession has been presumed involuntary and or retracted
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(Leo et al., 2013). Thus, a lack of recording puts a suspect at greater risk for being found guilty
by a judge or jury.
Relationship to False Confessions
If all criminal justice actors do their jobs with accuracy and attention to detail, it is likely
that they will realize that a confession is false before the case gets to trial. Although a false
confession can lead to a wrongful conviction, this is commonly due to errors along the path of
the criminal justice system, not solely because of the confession itself. Nonetheless, false
confessions have led to wrongful convictions in some cases. False confessions remain a
contributing source, but not the exclusive cause of wrongful convictions (Gould & Leo, 2010).
Three common errors occur when a false confession leads to a wrongful conviction:
“influence, persuasion, and compliance” (Gould & Leo, 2010, p. 844). First, an innocent person
is classified as guilty. This mistake stems from investigators being taught that according to the
Reid technique, they can accurately identify when someone is guilty. Next, an accusatorial
interrogation occurs because investigators are certain they have a guilty suspect. Particularly
when other sources of evidence are lacking, it is very important for investigators to be able to
obtain a confession. Finally, the primary cause of police-induced false confessions occurs last,
when interrogators use psychologically coercive interrogation methods (Gould & Leo, 2010).
When a suspect is able to give a post-confession narrative, the case against them is strengthened.
Keep in mind, however, that this narrative may come as a result of contamination by law
enforcement. After all, the narrative should contain privileged information if the person recalling
it is truly guilty.
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Understandably, a false confession is only likely to lead to a wrongfully confession if it is
entered into evidence at trial (Leo et al., 2013). Most false confession cases never actually result
in a conviction (Leo et al., 2013) because criminal justice actors’ diligence prevents this.
However, it is extremely likely that once a false confession is admitted to trial, that the person
will be wrongfully convicted (Leo et al., 2013).
Confessions and Plea Bargaining
The relationship between interrogations, confessions, and plea bargains is inseparable
because of the frequent use of plea bargaining today. Plea bargaining, while an arguably
necessary part of the justice system, contributes to the rate of false confessions. While plea
bargaining is a helpful tool in clearing out some of caseloads that overwhelm the judicial system,
it can also be an instrument to imprison and punish the innocent. The history of plea bargaining
can be intertwined with that of confession law to show the relationship between the two and how
plea bargaining plays a role in false confessions.
Recall that in 1819, the first instance of a false confession was recorded (Janzen, 2019).
In an 1825 treatise, Jeremy Bentham asserted that only the guilty remain silent when being
interrogated (Griffin, 2016). Of course, this is far from the truth, yet attitudes such as this are part
of the reason why false confessions remain evidentiary at trial. Bentham’s theory was the
beginning of plea bargaining as a necessary function of the court; as prison and court
overcrowding became more prominent issues, the justice system turned towards plea bargaining
as a means to quickly clear out the mounting caseload. Between 1908 and 1916, federal
convictions resulting from guilty pleas rose from 50% to 70%, and in 1925 it was up to almost
90% (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Throughout this time, appellate courts were reluctant to approve
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these deals, which contrasts the attitudes of these courts today-over 96% of convictions occur
because of plea bargaining (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Through the 1960s, the Supreme Court
remained reluctant to accept plea bargains, mainly because of the risk of convicting an innocent
defendant, who pled to avoid the risk of being wrongfully convicted by a judge or jury and
risking a longer sentence (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). However, the Court’s attitude shifted focus
towards being more concerned with getting rid of the huge number of cases in the system.
In 1967, even the American Bar Association, who had been opposed to plea bargaining,
began to warm up to the idea as “a necessary tool in an overburdened system” (Dervan &
Edkins, 2013, p. 12). This was corroborated by the ruling in Brady v. United States (1970), in
which the Supreme Court’s earlier fears came true: the defendant, Brady, pled guilty to avoid
being tried for the death penalty. This landmark case made plea bargaining not only permissible,
but able to emerge into the mainstream American criminal justice system in order to address
overcrowding and rising court costs (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). North Carolina v. Alford (1970)
established the use of the Alford plea, which allows a defendant to plead guilty while
maintaining innocence. An Alford plea can be utilized in false confession cases when a
defendant has given a false confession but anticipates a hard fight at trial to prove themselves
innocent. Thus, while an Alford plea can be helpful for someone who is guilty and wishes to get
off relatively easily, if the person is actually innocent, of course this plea would be less than
ideal. When a deal is appealing enough, it may make sense for a defendant to avoid trying to
prove their innocence and the risk of a longer sentence. Grunewald argues that if truth was truly
the ultimate goal of criminal proceedings, outcomes such as an Alford plea would not be allowed
(2014). After all, and Alford plea is the only way that a suspect could maintain their innocence
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while accepting a conviction and the consequences that come along with that. Thus, Alford pleas
are a contributing factor to false confessions because even when a suspect has issued a false
confession, they can still maintain innocence yet be convicted under Alford.
When a defendant pleads guilty, whether via plea bargain or at trial, this act essentially
negates the possibility of overturning his conviction in the future. This is because they are
considered to have given up their opportunity to utilize postconviction appeals (Scherr et al.,
2020). Further, innocent defendants are unlikely to be aware of the evidence that the prosecution
may have that is in fact in their favor. In essence, the fate of someone who pleads guilty is
virtually sealed, regardless of his guilt, or lack thereof. Miranda alone is not sufficient to prevent
an innocent person from confessing (Janzen, 2019) Thus, while criminal justice actors can and
will do everything in their power to avoid convicting an innocent person, plea bargaining
remains an attractive option for some. This inevitably leads to convictions of innocent people,
especially when the plea bargain results from the prosecution possessing a false confession as
evidence.
Confessions and Psychology
Confessions are of interest to the mental health profession because of these professionals’
role in evaluating their voluntariness (Appelbaum, 2009). Psychologists and psychiatrists utilize
their skills frequently in cases where coercion or contamination of a confession may have
occurred. While their perspectives are very valuable and backed by their knowledge and
education, the ability to assess coercion remains limited by a lack of objective measures (Rogers
et al., 2010).
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Mental health professionals are qualified to make a determination regarding the
voluntariness of a defendant in a confession. Expert psychological or psychiatric testimony can
assist in the determination of whether “there was a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary Miranda
waiver; whether the confession was coerced (involuntary); and whether the confession is
unreliable” (DeClue, 2005, p. 313). While a professional may be able to testify to the extent to
which they believe the defendant was coerced, it remains that the mere existence of coercion is
not enough to render a confession false or involuntary.
Psychological research shows that the traditional Reid interrogation method is likely to
elicit false confessions from vulnerable individuals because of the risk of psychological coercion
and manipulation (French, 2019). Reid tends to assume guilt and ignore denials, use
minimization tactics to ease a suspect into confessing, and it can use deceit and fabricated
evidence (French, 2019). When a suspect’s denials are repeatedly ignored, this may cause them
to feel defeated, as if they would rather admit guilt than keep trying to prove their innocence.
Also, using minimization tactics can make a suspect feel that even if they were wrongfully
convicted, their crime was not that bad anyways. This is relevant in cases where a suspect is
guilty of some but not all elements of a crime. Finally, by using deceit and fabricated evidence,
an exhausted and drained suspect can come to be convinced that maybe they actually did commit
the crime (French, 2019). Each of these risk factors increases significantly when coupled with
one or more of the others, and even more if the defendant possesses any of the earlier
characteristics that increase vulnerability (French, 2019).
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Why an Innocent Person Would Confess
It may seem counterintuitive that an innocent person would ever confess to a crime that
he did not commit. However, there are psychological processes that can be used to explain this
phenomenon. DeClue (2005) explains the three scenarios where a confession is given. First, selfinitiated confessions occur when an individual initiates contact with law enforcement in order to
turn themselves in for a crime; in this scenario, there is no pressure from law enforcement. Next,
one may confess in response to police questioning. Finally, police induced confessions occur
when a suspect initially claims they are not guilty, but later confesses (DeClue, 2005). False
confessions typically occur in the third scenario. An innocent person may decide to confess
because he decides that the benefits of confession ultimately outweigh the costs of resisting and
denying the accusations against him (Morehouse, 2019). For example, in a long, exhausting
interrogation, a suspect becomes increasingly worn down and vulnerable, and thus more
susceptible to relenting to the pressure being imposed upon him.
Innocent people are particularly susceptible to accepting a plea bargain. Despite claims
made by the court such as that in Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978), which “stated that as long as
the defendant is free to accept or reject a plea bargain, it is unlikely an innocent defendant will be
‘driven to false self-condemnation’” (Dervan & Edkins, 2013, p. 19), this not realistic. Studies
show that using false incriminating evidence has caused experiment subjects to give a false
confession, believe that actually committed the crime, and make up details consistent with these
beliefs (DeClue, 2005). This goes hand in hand with findings that pressure increases
vulnerability.
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Multiple studies confirm that certain characteristics make someone more susceptible to
give a false confession when they are actually innocent (DeClue, 2005). Even when law
enforcement officers do everything they can to avoid eliciting a false confession, some suspects
are simply more vulnerable to this risk (DeClue, 2005). A vulnerable individual can present as a
guilty person because of his emotional and mental state, and this can cause interrogators to
attribute guilt to him, particularly when they are using the Reid technique (Weiss, 2012). For
example, one study corroborated earlier findings that “giving false confessions during
interrogations is significantly related to antisocial personality characteristics and criminal
lifestyle” (Gudjonsson et al., 2004, p. 133). Thus, not only do outside influences impact one’s
suggestibility, but so do predispositions. These findings also support the view that some false
confessions are aimed at protecting someone else, and young people are particularly susceptible
to this (Gudjonsson et al., 2004).
Reduced Punishment
A 2013 study was conducted in which college students believed they would be taking a
test with real-life significance (Dervan & Edkins). After taking the test, participants were
accused of cheating on the exam, and false evidence was presented to corroborate this
accusation. Researchers found that unsurprisingly, guilty participants were more likely to plead
guilty than innocent participants (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). The secondary finding of the study
was that well over half of the innocent participants, regardless of which sentencing condition was
employed (harsh or lenient), were willing to offer a false confession in return for a reduced
punishment (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). This revealed that the participants were willing to avoid
the prolonged process of facing an academic dishonesty charge, in order to move straight to
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punishment (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Students believed they would have to take a remedial
class rather than being tried for academic dishonesty and risking a larger punishment. In other
words, “the students appear to have been selecting ‘probation’ and immediate release rather than
risking further ‘incarceration’ through forced participation in a trial and, if found guilty,
‘confinement’ in an ethics course or seminar” (Dervan & Edkins, 2013, p. 38). This study
created conditions similar to those that defendants face when they must choose to accept a plea
bargain or risk going to trial. However, the difficulty of such decisions is compounded by other
factors, particularly when the defendant has already falsely confessed to a crime.
Seven Psychological Processes
Leo and Davis (2010) determined that there are seven psychological processes that can
potentially lead to a false confession. These are important to be aware of for prosecutors and
mental health professionals because this can help them know what to look out for and avoid in an
interrogation. The first is the role of misleading specialized knowledge during the confession
process (Leo & Davis, 2010). Misleading specialized knowledge (MSK) is essentially the same
as privileged or contaminated information: information that would only be known to the true
perpetrator of a crime (Leo & Davis, 2010). When MSK is divulged to a suspect, whether
accidentally or purposefully, it biases decision making by setting the presumption of guilt in
motion (Leo & Davis, 2010). This also worsens when an interrogation goes unrecorded. When
an innocent person claims to have specialized knowledge of a crime, this increases his guilt in
the eyes of the officials and jury, causing these parties to rationalize other facts of the case that
do not match up with the case itself (Leo & Davis, 2010).
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Secondly, when an innocent individual is misclassified as guilty, the focus of the
investigation shifts to them, which creates a tunnel vision effect. This can occur as early as the
beginning of an interview (Leo & Davis, 2010). Misclassification can be impacted by one’s
motivational biases (Leo & Davis, 2010). Thus, an officer’s goal should always be accuracy:
accusing guilty people and releasing the innocent once he realizes his misidentification.
Misclassification involves the risk that law enforcement becomes convinced that a suspect is
actually guilty (Leo & Davis, 2010), and this can ultimately result in a wrongful conviction.
Another process which occurs is involving one’s emotion in cases. The overwhelming
emotions that come with being suspected of a crime will inevitably blur a suspect’s thinking and
make them more susceptible to outside influences. The risk of heightened emotions extends to
other parties in a case as well. For example, an investigator’s excitement about apprehending a
suspect may override his lingering feelings of unease or hesitancy (Leo & Davis, 2010). This
interacts with the influences exerted by institutions as well: there are financial incentives for
judges, counsel, and other criminal justice actors to achieve certain goals, such as maintaining a
high rate of convictions (Leo & Davis, 2010). Of course these material goals should never
outweigh the pursuit of justice.
Finally, Leo and Davis (2010) discuss the inadequate context for the evaluation of
evidence in some cases. By prematurely determining a suspect to be guilty, important evidence
may be ignored that would otherwise help officers secure a conviction of the correct individual.
Investigators may have bias once they have narrowed in on a suspect that prevents them from
considering the possibility of other individuals being responsible.
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Future Suggestions

As evidenced by the long, ever-changing history of confession law, it is a multifaceted
subject that multiple fields seek to address in the most effective way possible while also
preserving individual rights. Despite these efforts, there remains several areas where
improvements can be made. Such improvements can better the opportunity to obstruct a false
confession before it reaches a conviction or even a courtroom. This is important for preserving
individual rights.
Suspects
A defendant should be advised of the importance of asserting his constitutional rights,
especially the right to remain silent. After all, prosecutors cannot mention silence maintained at
trial as a reason for guilt, under the 5th Amendment (Griffin v. California, 1965). However, they
can discuss silence maintained by a suspect in an interrogation. Research shows that over 80% of
suspects waive their right to silence; innocent people waive this right because they believe they
have nothing to hide (Griffin, 2016). There are many understandable reasons why an innocent
person would stay silent, such as to help his case later at trial by not disrupting the strategy
chosen by his attorney (Griffin, 2016). Defendants should be cognizant of their right to silence
and assert this right even when they are innocent to reduce their risk of falsely confessing.
Interrogators
Ultimately, law enforcement is not legally required to act in a way that would allow a
suspect to make the most ideal choice for himself (Appelbaum, 2009). However, informing
suspects of their constitutional rights in greater detail than is currently required would help
suspects to understand their rights and know how to exercise them (Griffin, 2016), especially
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considering their vulnerable state as a suspect. This is socially and legally acceptable because of
law enforcement’s duty to extract a confession from those who are truly guilty, and uncover the
truth. Keeping this in mind, interrogators should remember that people will be wrongfully
suspected of committing a crime, no matter how diligently law enforcement works; there will be
some innocent suspects who are accused (Gudjonsson et al., 2004).
Interrogators must avoid threats and substantial mental and physical duress (Appelbaum,
2009). State and federal guidelines should outline what exactly this entails. For example,
interrogators should limit the length of interrogations to a reasonable time based on scientific
findings on what an individual can handle psychologically and physically (Griffin, 2016).
Further, interrogators should not offer any implicit promises of leniency, as these may convince a
suspect to confess to reduce the stress they are experiencing (French, 2019). Increased evaluation
should be done on techniques which are, while legally permissible, psychologically coercive.
While there are advocates for a more non-accusatory, information-gathering approach rather than
the traditional Reid technique (French, 2019), perhaps a hybrid or altered model could be used so
as to not completely disrupt the interrogative processes the country has been practicing for the
past 50 years.
Law enforcement should always refrain from informing eyewitnesses and lab examiners
of the presence or absence of a confession, because this can increase the chances that these
experts’ testimony and the results can change (Kassin, 2015). After all, a forensic expert should
contextualize defendant behavior and motivations while still being objective (Weiss, 2012).
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Prosecutors
Prosecutors are often not the cause of wrongful convictions, but it is important that like
other criminal justice actors, they are a part of the solution (MacLean et al., 2015). This entails
holding themselves to a high ethical standard in order to ensure that the criminal justice system
brings about results that are just (MacLean et al., 2015). Because prosecutors have access to both
the incriminating and exculpatory evidence, they should consider whether a confession matches
up with these.
Judges
Judges should give less weight to confessions that were a part of interrogations which
went unrecorded. Recording increases the ability for a judge to assess the voluntariness and
credibility of a confession. Research shows that the average person does not understand the risk
of false confessions, thus it would be helpful for a judge to inform the jury of such a risk, and
keep this in mind themselves (Kassin, 2015). Similarly, judges should consider: if a confession
contains information that would only be known to the perpetrator or their accomplice; if the
confession led police to new evidence; and whether the suspect’s narrative in their confession fits
the crime and its evidence (Primus, 2015). This is another safeguard against letting a false
confession slip through the judicial system’s cracks.
Reform has to start somewhere, and when it is prompted by the courts, judges have the
opportunity to show prosecutors that they will not tolerate the risk of incriminating an innocent
person (French, 2019). While this is already a goal of judges, they can further demonstrate their
commitment to truth and justice by strictly evaluating evidence that is admitted into court, and
blocking unjust evidence when possible.
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Policy Makers
Policy makers have perhaps the most influential role in bringing about further change for
confession laws. Recent findings must inform future policy. Policy makers have the power to
essentially stop a false confession before it starts, by putting guidelines in place that can
strategically mitigate the common factors that put a suspect at risk of giving a false confession.
First, suspects should not be required to self-invoke their interrogation rights (Scherr et
al., 2020). Rather than the existing necessity for an individual to invoke their rights such as that
of silence or legal counsel, these rights should be automatically enforced for every person at the
start of their interrogation. This would significantly help innocent people, who often waive their
rights because they are confident in their innocence and not worried about being convicted. A
blanket invocation of rights during all interrogations would help preserve innocence and prevent
people from making mistakes and confessing when they are actually innocent.
Another requirement that should be implemented is video and audio recording of all
interrogations, including precustodial interviews, reading of Miranda rights, and custodial
interrogations (French, 2019; Griffin, 2016; Janzen, 2019; Kassin, 2015; Primus, 2015).
Presently, “half of all states, the District of Columbia, and federal agencies require the full
recording of custodial interrogations; other states do not” (Scherr et al., 2020, p. 370). Data
shows that the agencies which have done so favor the technique (Scherr et al., 2020). This is
corroborated by research showing that police participants who knew they were being recorded
were less likely to use high-pressure tactics on suspects. Further, their suspects perceived them as
less pressuring, when compared to officers who did not know they were being recorded (Scherr
et al., 2020). Recording interrogations helps with evidence preservation and clearly shows how
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an interrogator led on a suspect and affected their narrative of events (Gould & Leo, 2010). It
also causes an interrogator to be more self-aware of the tactics they choose to use; this inhibits
the use of what can be error-ridden tactics (Kassin, 2015). Recording also allows jurors to
compare oral testimony from the trial with primary evidence from the interrogation. At the very
least, this requirement should extend to all felony cases (DeClue, 2005) because of their
significant consequences.
Courts should also refuse to admit evidence that has been obtained as a result of feeding
suspects false evidence. Not only do confession experts agree that misinformation about an event
can alter a suspect’s memory of said event, but also that presentations of false incriminating
evidence increase the risk that an innocent suspect will confess (Kassin et al., 2018; Scherr et al.,
2020); thus, no fabricated primary evidence should be introduced into the interrogation room
(French, 2019). A confession should always be corroborated by independent evidence to be
considered reliable (DeClue, 2005).
Threatening a suspect with the death penalty should render any subsequent confession
involuntary (Morehouse, 2019). After a person has been threatened with death, his confession is
inherently unreliable (Morehouse, 2019). This provision should be extended to include any
threats of physical violence, either towards the suspect or their family (Primus, 2015). Simply
put, the tactics that police use must be regulated more closely; this includes violence as well as
coercion (Primus, 2015). Further, questioning cannot continue indefinitely or without breaks. A
determination of specific guidelines should use scientific findings regarding humans’ biological
needs to make recommendations for deprivation limits (Primus, 2015), and policymakers should
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list the tactics that are clearly impermissible (Primus, 2015). The use of scientific research will
provide an objective basis for new policies.
Psychologists
Future research needs to focus on how to present information to jurors in ways that
facilitate optimal decision making (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019), rather than the bare minimum of
simply presenting them with their rights and assuming they are fully understood. Psychologists
can play a significant contributing role in research in this area, and in other areas of confession
law because of their understanding of the human mind and decision making.
Psychologists should be able to testify in court to support or oppose the admission of a
confession to court (Kassin, 2015). Currently, psychologists may know that a defendant was
coerced, but not to an extent that legally renders their confession involuntary. By giving medical
professionals the opportunity to testify, jurors can better understand false confessions and their
causes, “which may enable jurors to better identify coercive interrogation tactics and assess the
veracity of a confession” (Kukucka & Evelo, 2019, p. 383). This will also help address the issue
of jurors not understanding why or how an innocent person would confess.
Despite law enforcement’s best efforts to avoid eliciting a false confession, it may still
occur because of a suspect’s personal characteristics. In such cases, psychologists should testify
that law enforcement showed attentiveness toward suspect vulnerability and they took steps to
document that the suspect understood their rights, the reason why they waived these rights, the
reason why they confessed, and that they were able to provide details which could only have
been provided by a perpetrator of a crime (DeClue, 2005). A psychologist’s testimony is relevant
when it helps a judge to decide whether a person has made a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
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waiver of their Miranda rights (DeClue, 2005). Declue recommends that in order to establish
these things, these professionals: establish a suspect’s narrative before, during, and after his
waiver of Miranda; analyze this narrative; conduct a psychological evaluation of the suspect; and
consider the interactions between the narrative and the evaluation in order to determine the
suspect’s mental state at the time of the waiver (2005).
Biblical Worldview
Strang (2020) asserts that “If there is more to criminal justice than truth-seeking alone,
then to avoid defeat of the additional goals of dignity and integrity, we have to reject even the
accurate confession if involuntarily obtained.” (p. 76). As previously stated, the majority of law
enforcement agents desire to uphold the ideals of the criminal justice system and desire to not let
any false confessions fall through the cracks. However, despite their best intentions and efforts,
they can nonetheless still occur. This ultimately all comes as a consequence of living in a fallen
world; crime will run rampant until Christ returns and the world is truly whole and perfect again.
However, it is the duty of Christians to uphold biblical values, including pursuing truth and
justice to the best of their ability.
Justice and truth cannot be separated; they go hand in hand (Grunewald, 2014). These
ideals can be further pursued by implementing the recommended changes. Although such
changes will require significant efforts from many criminal justice actors, they will allow the
system to align more closely with the ideals that it upholds.
Conclusion
The influential actors in the criminal justice system should be open to change and willing
to consider and implement suggestions that have been proven to be effective (Gould & Leo,
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2010). Because these suggestions have a scientific basis and have been proven to work in
experimental settings, this bodes well for anticipating that they will be effective in the real world.
These changes are necessary as interrogation procedures and confession admissibility standards
adapt to suit the changing needs and attitudes of the justice system. Making such changes will
not only elicit the most accurate confession possible, thus protecting individual rights, but in
doing so they will also reduce the number of false confessions and resulting wrongful
convictions.
While the instances of false confessions that lead to wrongful convictions are relatively
low, each of these miscarriages of justice represents an innocent human being punished for a
crime they are not guilty of. These are errors of the justice system that should not and cannot be
ignored. From a Biblical perspective, allowing a false confession to play out and impact an
innocent person’s life is not carrying out justice, which is a value that God imposes throughout
his Word (Isaiah 1:17, Isaiah 61:8, Zechariah 7:9).
The issue of false confessions is one that will continue to exist as long as humanity lives
in a fallen world, because sin is present, including lying and deceit for one’s own gain. However,
this does not prevent criminal justice actors from doing everything in their power to reduce the
number of innocent people who are impacted negatively by interrogation methods used, up to the
point of being wrongfully convicted of a crime. This issue urgently needs to be addressed by
policymakers so that impactful changes can flow down through the criminal justice system to
eventually reach innocent defendants.
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